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Abstract 
The green credit policy has made remarkable achievements in energy saving, emission reduction and industrial 
structure optimization, however, due to the collusion between enterprises and local government, a huge gap exists 
between the reality and expectation in the process of policy execution. The collusion is the result of cooperative game 
through Nash bargaining. Banks, as agents in carrying out the green credit policy, offer preferential interest rate that 
influences the collusion. This paper analyzes the collusion and factors affecting its incidence on the bas is of 
constructing the expected profit functions of both the enterprise and the local government. Meanwhile, we obtain the 
optimal volume of loans and offer several relevant suggestions for policy. 
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1. Introduction 
With the increasing urgency of protecting the environment, in mid-July 2007 the State Environmental 
Protection Administration and People's Bank Regulatory Commission jo intly issued the Suggestions on 
the implementation of environmental protection policies and regulations against credit risk. In this 
document, the green credit mechanism is formally proposed to curb the blind expansion of high-pollution 
industries and the credit tilt is provided to support environmentally friendly infrastructure projects, 
institutional reform of traditional industries and pollution control projects.  
Green cred it, also known as sustainable finance, main ly aims at obtaining sustainable development 
through adjustment of the financial industry’s business philosophy, management policies and operation 
processes. Concurrently, actively performing banks allocate the credit funds following one vote veto 
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principle, which means that loans in no circumstances flow into enterprises without Qualification 
Cert ificate of Environmental Protection issued by the local government. Once serious environmental 
accidents occur in enterprises or construction projects, banks immediately stop providing funds and even 
recover the already granted loans. 
The green credit policy originally intends to hinder the development of the enterprises that possess 
“high pollution, high consumption, and high emission” and to prevent blind start-up of projects that 
probably pose potential threats to the environment. Since the policy has been promulgated, environmental 
protection work d id effect in China. However, the results and expectations are widely d ivergent. This 
phenomenon is referred to as the Paradox of Green Credit in China. There are two main reasons 
responsible for it. On  one hand, due to feeble environmental awareness, shortage of talents and 
non-standard operating procedures, financial institutions do lack the sensitivity to environmental risks; on 
the other hand, in current system in China, banks have to face co llusion between local government and 
businesses when they jointly  cheat banks of cred it funds with forged Qualification Cert ificate of 
Environmental Protection. Encountering this reality, is the green credit  policy  the antidote to increasingly 
urgent environmental problems? Can’t the policy unlock the magic spell of co llusion as a rent-seeking 
tool at the expense of the environment? 
Many scholars have done research on the collusion in organizations. Kofman et al. (1993) studied 
collusion in  hierarchical agency. Tirole  (1992) constructed the theoretical framework of co llusion 
behavior and collusion-proof incentive mechanism. Collusion occurs mainly due to informat ion 
asymmetry among agents, supervisors and principals and existence of rent in the general contract. Laffont 
et al. (1998) found that limits on communication between the agent and the principal create collusion, 
undermin ing the efficiency of the centralized arrangement. Laffont et al. (2000) also discussed mechanism 
design under collusion. In previous analysis of collusion in environmental issues, there exist two main  
ideas. One focuses on discussing the formation conditions of collusion between local governments and 
enterprises, constructing the game model and solving the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Through 
comparative static analysis, it analyzes how all the related variables exert the influences on collusion. 
Chun-Ying Zhang (2008) and Lilong He et al. (2009) found out, when the game reaches equilibrium, 
collusion incidence has positive relationship with central government's regulatory costs, and has negative 
relationship with successful regulation rate and the amount of penalty . Others main ly depict the 
informat ion structure and utility functions of all participants, and then discuss the incentive compatibility 
constraints and participation constraints and establish the collusion-proof mechanis m. Huihua Nie (2006) 
and Yu-Long Ren et al. (2008) established the optimal mechanisms under the analytical framework of 
principal-agent theory. 
At present, there is little in-depth research on green credit paradox from the perspective of collusion. 
This paper is distinguished from other relevant study into green credit problems by  specially  analyzing the 
behaviour of banks. On one hand, in  the relat ionship among “principal (central government), supervisor 
(local government) and agent (enterprises)”, the bank, as an independent fourth party, influences collusion 
with the exert ion of preferential interest rate. On the other hand, as a for-profit operating body, the bank 
has to adjust management strategy and make scientific decisions on offering loans to maximize its profit. 
Model one discusses how collusion incidence is determined as a result of Nash bargain ing. And model 
two, basing on the bank’s angle, d iscusses ways to rationalize control variables on loans to gain the 
greatest profit.  
2. Model One: collusion incidence 
2.1. Information structure and cost-benefit analysis 
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In this model, central government acts as the principal mandating enterprises to protec t the 
environment. But supervising all companies’ environmental friendliness is impossible. So the supervision 
has to count on the local government for access to environmental informat ion. In the absence of 
supervision under the central government, the local government has motive to conceal the truth and 
colludes with enterprises . In order to prevent such collusion, principal selects irregular random 
investigation. The probability of the central government disclosing the collusion is  d , the probability 
otherwise is d1 . Once collusions are disclosed, the enterprises  and local governments will be fined 
at gc ff , respectively.  
Local governments play the role of supervisor in this principal-agent relationship, for its information 
symmetry with local businesses. Bounded by prevailing official performance evaluation system, local 
governments usually lay over-emphasis on the GDP. Wrong concept of political performance, together 
with the temptation of bribes from enterprises, leads to distortion of the cost-benefit function which gives 
rise to collusion. In  the case of no collusion, the main revenues of local government come from corporate 
tax revenues ct(  , otherwise, it will additionally receive bribe B  , but once collusion is brought to 
light, the penalty amounts to gf . 
As rational economic entities, enterprises protect the environment not only for social morality and 
public welfare , but optimizing the profits. Typically, the cost of a company starting a major pro ject is 
interests I ( ,AiI   A  denotes principal, i  denotes interest rate). A company selects environmental 
protection at the probability of v1  , hence, the probability of not to do so is  v  .If the company 
chooses the latter, only by co lluding (reasonable assumption), can  it  get loans from banks, therefore, 
collusion incidence exactly equals to v  . Not protecting the environment saves an enterprise 
environmental facility construction fees  C'  , whose consideration is the bribe B  , if the collusion is 
unveiled, it will loss cf . 
The bank is the fourth party, but it has to allocate credit funds under such conditions as information 
asymmetry, the same situation as the central government. On one hand, banks rely on Qualification 
Certificate of Environmental Protection issued by local government as the basis of one vote veto. On the 
other, in the effort of risk management, banks usually evaluate authenticity of that certificate. Although 
the bank doesn’t know the accurate collusion incidence, but it  can roughly estimate the incidence by 
means of checking the company’s accounts and site inspections. As there is a wide range of factors 
influencing banks’ estimat ion, the estimated incidence will be close to the fact. Hence, the estimated 
collusion incidence follows the normal distribution with parameters P  and V  , thereof v P  . 
Banks determine the interest rate ( )vi c  according to the estimated collusion incidence vc  , which is an 
important means to control environmental risks. Even so, if the collusion is d isclosed and the involved 
company is shut down, the risk still can not be avoided. Then the principal A will proportionally become 
dad debts. 
2.2. Collusion incidence 
In green credit policy, there are three states of an enterprise: 
ķIt chooses to protect environment at the probability of v1  ; 
ĸIt chooses not to protect environment at the probability of v  , and collusion occurs, then it is 
disclosed at the probability of d  ; 
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ĹIt chooses not to protect environment at the probability of v  , and collusion occurs, but it is not 
disclosed at the probability of d1  ; 
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Once the collusion is profitable, it occurs. In the collusion, bribe B  is an important parameter 
affecting allocated interests between the enterprise and local government. The bribe is the result of 
cooperative game through Nash bargaining based on the respective expected profits and bargaining power 
of two part icipants. We assume the bargaining power of the enterprise and the supervisor are respectively D1  and )10( DD  ˈso the bribe B  can be determined as follows: 
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If the value of B  is substituted in gc (( ,  , we get: 
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It has been mentioned that banks determine the interest rate i  on the basis of estimated collusion 
incidence vc  , a normal distribution of which the mean is the true incidence v  , hence vv  c( )( . 
Assuming that 20)( ))(( vmii v c( c , 0!m  , m  denotes discriminatory interest rate coefficient. 
When 1m !  , the coefficient helps the interest rate rise multiple times with the estimated collusion 
incidence. In short, m  plays an important role in decid ing the level of interest rate, and thus affects the 
collusion incidence. 0i  denotes the basic interest rate to the environmentally friendly businesses. The 
higher the estimated collusion incidence is, the greater the company's financing costs  are. Collusion 
occurs at a certain  rate when both the enterprises and local governments maximize their expected profits, 
so˖ 
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2.3. Comparative static analysis 
From solution (8), conclusion incidence v  is determined by four factors, environmental facility 
costs C'  , collusion disclosure probability d  , penalty cf  and gf  , discriminatory interest rate 
coefficient m  . Research on each variable’s  impact on v  with comparative static analysis is as 
follows: 
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Lemma one: collusion incidence has a positive correlation with C'  , but a negative one with cf 
and gf  . 
Remark : obviously, C'  is the company’s saved cost after collusion and equivalent to additional 
gains. The desire for collusion becomes stronger with the enhancement of C'  . On the contrary,  cf 
and gf  are risks that both sides of collusion is confronted with, the higher the fines are, the more 
conservatively and discreetly enterprises behave.  
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Lemma two: the collusion disclosure rate reduces  v  , so does the discriminatory interest rate 
coefficient m  . 
Remark : The collusion can only be unveiled and disposed of by central government. The power of 
monitoring acts in  the same way as penalty. Banks can control the loans in  advance rather than supervise 
and punish the enterprises. m  functions to amplify the collusion risks. Banks can raise m  to retard  
collusion. 
3. Model Two: the bank’s optimal behaviour 
3.1. The bank’s revenue function 
The most notable difference between our research and others  which  merely  focus on collusion 
between government and enterprises lies in the involvement of banks. As the main part  of the green cred it 
policy, banks undertake the risk shifted from environmental-unqualified enterprises being shut down. 
However, faced  with the co llusion, banks can neither get the real in formation, nor punish them. To make 
the optimal choice, banks have to control interest rate and credit lines to achieve their own maximum 
benefit. For the bank, no  matter whether the enterprise is environmentally friendly or not and the 
collusion is revealed or not, the enterprise will receive interests I  . In spot-checks, once a company is 
1984  Duan Jin and Niu Mengqi / Energy Procedia 5 (2011) 1979–1986
identified as environmentally unfriendly, it will be fined or even shut down. If the company gets off so 
mildly that its repayment ability isn’t fundamentally affected, it is still possible for the bank to recover the 
principal;  otherwise, in  the case of heavy fines or bankruptcy, the loss is often huge to banks. Suppose 
that the company’s probability of repaying principal is k1  , hence they’re insolvent at the rate of  
k  .Then the expected value for the bank to recover the loan principal is: 
kAkkAAE  u 0)1()(  . By above analysis, the bank’s revenue function is : 
( ) ( ) ( )(1 ) ( ( )) (1 )B v v vE v I v d I E A d Ic c cª º     ¬ ¼  
                     ( )vI vdkAc                                            (11) 
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Lemma three: if the enterprise is not environmentally friendly, in order to raise the expected return, 
banks must enhance the probability of company’s repayment of the principal as much as possible. 
Remark : for one thing, banks should strengthen subsequent supervision on loans, for another, 
cooperation between banks and the central government should be deepened to establish and the loan loss 
provisions mechanism and compensation mechanism should be reformed. 
3.2. Optimal relationships among control variables 
We have concluded that 
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Obviously, B(  is dependent on loan principal A  . On one hand, larger principal raises interest 
income; on the other hand, once banks cannot recover them, risks turn into default. Hence, banks can 
determine a proper A  to maximize its expected proceeds. 
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Lemma four: To  banks, loan principal A  , discriminatory interest rate coefficient m  and basic 
interest rate 0i  as a whole can enhance the profits as well as control the risks. When the three satisfy 
certain relationships, the bank can achieve profit maximization.  
4. Conclusion 
In the current system, the distortion of concept of political performance and malversation, such as 
rent-seeking, add so many obstacles to the central government's policy that it is difficult to resolutely 
implement. Based on the above analysis, we can obtain from the model not only the probability of 
collusion but its dominants, and we also discuss how banks can achieve their maximum benefit. We put 
forward a number of suggestions for policy to carry out the green credit policy from the following 
perspectives. 
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A) To ensure the collection and disclosure of environmental data, strengthening supervision and 
punishment.  
Information  asymmetry  between central government and banks o f corporation’s environmental 
protection data gives rise to collusion between government and enterprises. First of all, a  multi-agent 
informat ion linkage mechanis m should be established to achieve transparency of informat ion, to create 
frequent informat ion exchange between local environmental p rotection departments and financial 
institutions. Second, the central government should strengthen supervision and more active ly and 
effectively  control the enterprise's environmental situation in various regions. A supervision system 
should be established as a stable and long-term mechanis m and a cred it informat ion database should be 
integrally  set up including information about enterprises’ breaking environmental laws, getting 
environmental approvals and progressing in energy saving. In addition, the central government should 
take tough measures to raise fines, increas ing the explicit costs. In the long run, the existing wrong view 
of political performance should be reformed to enhance the hidden losses brought by collusion.  
B) To improve the banks’ environmental risk management, and  pay attention to the use of market 
measures.  
As to banks, granting green credit is not a mere public  benefit act ivity or a response to the policy, but 
an important means to enhance their core competit iveness and operational capacity. It  just hit the point of 
green credit policy for banks to adjust the parameters of granting a loan, using the market instruments to 
allocate credit resources. Discriminatory interest rate coefficient serves as a shield for environmentally 
friendly enterprises, but a punishment mechanism to unsatisfactory businesses. Reasonable increase in 
that coefficient can reduce the probability of collusion; bas ic rate, that coefficient and the amount of loans 
should be comprehensively set to maximize the expected proceeds. In Model one corporations are 
roughly divided as environmentally friendly and unfriendly, however, in reality, corporat ions can be rated 
in details in terms of environmental protection level. In the cred it process, banks should correctly evaluate 
possible types of environmental risk encountered by businesses , classify them and perform the 
discriminatory interest rate management. 
Banks should lay particular emphasis on post control, at any time monitor ing the debtor’s daily 
business operations and environmental conditions. Although banks can not  detect symptom of high 
pollution with field survey methods, they’re able to refer to account books. Once the bank finds debtor’s 
over-inflated profits, extremely low amort ization amount of environmental protection facilit ies costs etc., 
it ought to timely pay great attention and take appropriate measures to reduce the losses. Banks can create 
a series of supporting systems covering green credit  bad debt write-offs, risk provision accrue and 
close-ended payments to ensure the security of credit funds. 
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